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THE BOTTOM LINE?  
Connecticut wants improved power reliability …
but don’t put any new generating plants in my
backyard, don’t expand the role of the market, and
don’t ration my power.  And whatever you do,
remember that many of us don’t want to pay for
it.  Maybe California will lend us Governor
Schwarzenegger—but as Mr. Universe, hitched to a
turbine generator.   
By Steven P. Lanza
Production changes by oil-producing nations and a demonstrably rickety elec-
tricity grid are making energy markets as volatile as ever.  But a fact of econom-
ic life in Connecticut is that energy is already expensive, and high prices have
encouraged us to become the leader among states in energy efficiency.  So if
we’re less dependent on energy, it stands to reason that we should be less vul-
nerable to the vagaries of energy markets, right?  Wrong.  It turns out that a
spike in energy prices can really sap some juice out of the state’s economy.
Unlike states with significant endowments of energy resources, or those
located within easy reach of energy suppliers, Connecticut sits at the end of
the proverbial energy pipeline.  Thus, prices are high here compared with
many other states.  According to the latest data from the U.S. Energy
Information Administration (EIA), Connecticut’s cost in 2000 for energy from
all sources—coal, natural gas, electricity, and petroleum—averaged $12.66 per
million Btu.  That same year, the U.S. average was just $9.85, so energy prices
in our state exceeded the national average by about 29%.  Only four other
states—Vermont, Hawaii, New Hampshire, and Arizona (in that order)—faced
an average energy price above ours.
High energy prices encourage conservation and discourage energy-intensive
production.  As the scatterplot below suggests, high prices generally mean
low levels of energy expenditure.  The chart compares the price of energy in
2000 to each state’s spending on energy as a percentage of gross state prod-
uct.  A trendline drawn through the scatterplot summarizes that relationship:
a 1% rise in price is associated with a 1% drop in expenditure.  Connecticut
is the dot at the extreme left of the chart, with spending on energy equal to
just 5.1% of gross state product—the lowest of any state.  In contrast, the
average for all states was 8.1% of gross state product.  Louisiana, with its
petroleum-based economy, headed the list (at the rightmost extreme) at
14.3%.
Relative prices not only influence total energy consumption; they also affect
the mix of energy sources used.  In high-cost Connecticut, for example, coal is
particularly pricey, while oil is relatively cheap.  With the price of coal 80%
above the U.S. average in 2000, Nuttmeggers understandably drew just 4% of
their energy from coal, compared with 22% for the U.S.  Oil, by contrast, was
“only” 30% more expensive than the U.S. average, so state residents met 44%
of their energy needs using petroleum, as compared with 39% for the U.S.
Despite our state’s relatively high dependence on oil, we’ve made a science
out of energy efficiency.  But does that mean Connecticut can easily navigate
a rough road in energy prices?
Shopping for the Right Model
Energy appeared abruptly in the public’s headlights back in the mid-1970s,
when a succession of OPEC-induced energy crunches exacerbated the econo-
my’s woes and
exposed its addiction
to fossil fuels.  It was
common then, as
now, to think of eco-
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Last but definitely not least, Connecticut residents
feel strongly about the subject of power plants, both
new and existing.  As the pie charts show, a majority
opposed locating a new coal-fired plant in their own
town, even if it would augment the tax base.  An
even greater majority opposed a new nuclear facility.
NIMBY indeed!  
Chart 2: How About New or
Existing Power Plants?
Energy Spending as a Fraction of GSP in 2000
New 
Coal-Fired ...
... or New 
Nuclear?
... or Existing Oil Fired Plants?
Interestingly, a majority favored keeping the exist-
ing, high-polluting, “sooty six” plants open rather
than closing them.  One could speculate that it’s
because they’re in someone else’s backyard.  
Source: The Connecticut Economy based on data from EIA and BEA.explanatory power of such models.  In a 1977 study, Robert
Rasche and John Tatom at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
modeled U.S. output over the period 1949 to 1975 as a function
of capital and labor inputs and energy prices (“Energy Resources
and Potential GNP,” June 1977 Review, p. 10-24). Their results
pointed to a significant inverse relationship between energy
prices and economic performance, and showed that including
energy improved the model’s estimates of output.
The link between energy prices and performance is straightfor-
ward enough: higher prices should reduce energy use, and, with
less energy being used, output should decline, too.  But as we
have seen, energy does not play the same role everywhere, so
states may not all respond the same way to changes in the ener-
gy market.  
To test the comparative effects of changing energy prices, I fol-
lowed Rasche and Tatom in estimating output as a function of
capital and labor inputs and energy prices.  I updated the analy-
sis to include data from the period 1977 to 2000, but also cus-
tomized the model to provide separate estimates for each of the
fifty states.
My measure of output is real gross state product in private
industries, an inflation-adjusted measure of the value of final
goods and services produced by the private sector.  In 2000, for
example, Vermont had the smallest state private output, $14.8
billion in 1996 dollars, while California was largest at $1,112.3
billion.  Connecticut ranked 22nd at $138.8 billion.
There are no reliable, readily available figures for capital stock
by state.  But the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) does
publish annual estimates of the size of the U.S. capital stock.
Assuming that each state’s capital-output ratio is the same as the
nation’s (about 2.8 to 1 over the period), I can guesstimate the
state figures by just scaling real output by each year’s appropri-
ate capital-output ratio.  
Unlike capital, estimates of labor inputs by state are easy to
find.  I used BEA data on total private-sector employment by
state.  Predictably, California led the states in 2000 with an
employment total that topped 17.1 million, but this time
Wyoming ranked last, with 264,000 private-sector employees.  At
1.9 million, Connecticut ranked 27th.
For energy prices, I used the state-by-state EIA data referred to
above.  In 2000, the price of energy was highest in Vermont at
$13.68 per million Btu, and lowest in Montana at $6.50. In nom-
inal terms, energy prices held fairly steady across states through-
out much of the 1977-2000 period, but adjusted for inflation the
trend was actually downward.  And for purposes of estimating
changes in real output, real prices are what matters.
Taking the Model for a Test Drive
So how does the model perform?  The bar graph below shows
the range of effects on real private-sector gross state product
associated with a 10% increase in real energy prices, holding
constant any influences from other input variables.  For the aver-
age state, a 10% increase in real energy prices is associated with
a 1.3% decrease in real output, holding capital and labor con-
stant.  This result is nearly identical to the 1.4% figure for the
U.S. as a whole identified by Rasche and Tatom 26 years ago.
Connecticut is among the group of states (located chiefly in the
Northeast and along the West Coast) for which an increase in
energy prices has the biggest negative effect.  Arizona’s economy
would bear the greatest burden from an increase in energy
prices, suffering a 3.4% fall in real output from a 10% increase
in price.  But Connecticut’s burden wouldn’t be much less, at
2.5% less output.
For some states—Wyoming, Oklahoma, Texas, and Alaska—an
increase in energy prices would actually improve economic per-
formance.  These are big energy-producing states that gain
income when energy prices go up.  But for Alabama and
Louisiana, the gains to their energy-producing sectors are largely
offset by the losses to their energy-consuming sectors.  For all
other states, higher real prices mean lower real output.
What accounts for the varying responses among states to
changes in energy prices?  As already suggested, the mix of
industries among states is important.  States with industry con-
centrations in energy extraction are helped by rising prices.
States like Arizona and Colorado, with extensive mining opera-
tions, or New Jersey and Delaware, with high concentrations in
refining and petrochemicals, are hurt when energy prices go up.
Although Connecticut’s energy-intensive manufacturing sector
has waned over time, the state retains a higher-than-average
industry concentration in this sector and in subsectors, such as
chemical products, that are particularly energy-sensitive.
Why isn’t Connecticut’s sensitivity to price changes mitigated
by its relative energy efficiency?  After all, if we don’t use much
energy to begin with, an increase in price should have fairly
modest negative consequences for production.  But it doesn’t,
and we’re not alone.  Other states, such as California, New York
and Massachusetts, where energy is also a small part of total
output, are also among the more sensitive to changes in energy
prices.  Perhaps it is precisely that sensitivity, along with rela-
tively high energy prices, that encourage states to find ways to
use energy more efficiently.  This much is clear: energy prices
matter everywhere, but they’re especially important in
Connecticut.

















































































































A Jump in Energy Prices is a Drag on Performance
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